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1 Introduction
The eects of nancial constraints on rm behavior have received much attention in recent
years.
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There are essentially three dierent levels of aggregation at which these eects
have been investigated. At the micro (rm) level, the availability of outside nance has
been identied as a major determinant of rm growth and survival. Because of nancial
constraints, rms may be prevented from realizing promising projects they have at hand,
or even from undertaking R&D in the rst place. Once a rm has started an investment
project or entered a market with a new product, it may still be driven out because of
a lack of funds. Both eects of incomplete capital markets are { at rst sight { not
desirable from a welfare view. This leads to the industry level, where both industrial and
nancial economists have studied the role of capital markets in industrial restructuring;
these models also rely on a link between the rm's nancial status and its investment
policies. Welfare implications of nancial constraints can be dierent here: Financial
constraints (i. e., the fact that pressure is put on rms' management by outside suppliers
of funds) can prevent overinvestment in general, and can help to reduce excess capacity
in declining industries by forcing rms to exit. These eects of nancial constraints
involve eciency gains and might increase aggregate welfare (although the latter issue is
subject to an ongoing debate). Finally, there is a large macroeconomic literature which
identies the sensitivity of investment to the rm's nancial status as a central part of
the credit (or lending) channel of monetary policy transmission. These models argue that
imperfections in capital markets, resulting for example in credit constraints, can lead to
or exacerbate business cycle uctuations by propagating relatively modest monetary (and
in some models, also real) shocks.
While there are quite a few theoretical models of the inuence of nancial constraints
on rm investment (with important policy implications at the rm, industry, and macro
levels), empirical evidence is still mixed. There are, however, several empirical studies
which conrm the sensitivity of rm investment to nancial constraints. A prominent
example is the paper by Fazzari et al . (1988); they were the rst to report empirical
evidence on the existence of credit rationing using rm panel data. Their empirical
approach has since been rened along various dimensions. The objective of this paper is
to assess whether a rm's nancial status inuences its investment and exit decisions at
the plant level. By doing this, it addresses some objections that have been raised against
earlier empirical tests of nancial constraints in the tradition of Fazzari et al . (1988). In
particular, it takes up the following issues:-
1. Using rm-level data might introduce aggregation biases into empirical models of
investment decisions. The dynamics of investment spending at the plant level seem
1
Hubbard (1998) provides a detailed review of the theoretical and empirical literature on rm investment
and nancial constraints.
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to be much richer than rm-level data would suggest. It is therefore likely that
the eects of nancial constraints are most severe at the plant level and at least
partially washed out when investment is aggregated to the rm level.
2. Most studies of nancial constraints and investment decisions have used balanced
panels of continuing rms, hence ignoring selection biases due to endogenous market
exits (which might well be related to the rm's nancial status). At the same time,
market exits are more likely to occur at the plant level rst: Before an entire rm
is closed, it is likely that some of its plants are closed or sold.
3. The standard approach to identifying nancially constrained rms uses indicators
such as rm size or some balance-sheet variable (e. g., the dividend payout ratio or
leverage) as a sample-split criterion. This approach has been challenged by Kaplan
and Zingales (1997); they propose an alternative measure of a rm's nancial status.
In their view, its main advantages are, rst, that it takes into account non-balance
sheet information, and second, that it is allowed to vary over time, reecting changes
in macroeconomic conditions and/or the rms' nancial policies.
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The empirical approach to analyzing rm behavior under nancial constraints suggested
in this study addresses these issues in a consistent framework, a joint model of rms'
investment and market exit decisions. The sample used in this study is essentially that
considered by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), which is, in turn, based on the group of rms
identied as being nancially constrained by Fazzari et al . (1988). The dataset itself
consists primarily of plant-level data on output and factor inputs, including investment
spending, for all plants owned by these rms during the 1972{84 period. These plant-
level observations, taken from the U.S. Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database
(LRD), are matched with data on the respective rm's nancial status. Firm-level data
are, rst, the ordinal nancial status indicator constructed by Kaplan and Zingales, and
second, for comparison with standard approaches, balance-sheet variables from Compus-
tat.
This research strategy follows Kaplan and Zingales by focusing on the eects of capital
market imperfections on investment (rather than trying to identify the sources of the
capital market imperfections at work). The central simplifying assumption needed to
make the model operational is that the rm's nancial decisions are separated from the
structural model of plant-level investment and exit decisions. This approach does not
amount to a full structural model of rm behavior, but it allows for a consistent treatment
of investment and exit decisions at the plant level, taking rm-level nancial status as
given.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews empirical studies of
rm investment under nancial constraints and discusses some problems associated with
2
Their arguments are reviewed below in Section 2.
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the measurement of rms' nancial status, with the endogeneity of exit decisions, and
with the use of rm-level data in empirical investment models. The empirical approach
taken here, matching rm and plant-level data, and the resulting dataset are described in
Section 3. Estimation results for various models of plant-level operating and investment
decisions are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical tests for nancial constraints: A review
In this section, I present a selective review of the empirical literature on nancial con-
straints and rm investment. Its main purpose is to discuss some recurrent methodological
problems which I attempt to address in this study.
The early empirical literature on nancially constrained rms focused on the leading
special case, credit rationing (dened as a situation in which borrowers cannot borrow
as much as they would like given an unconstrained optimization model with complete
nancial markets). It is clear that nding empirical evidence on whether credit rationing
exists is dicult even in absence of any measurement problems: Only the amount of
credit that is actually transacted can be observed, but { by assumption { not the amount
that is demanded. A standard approach to address this problem is to estimate a reduced-
form equation of rm investment which includes some variable assumed to reect credit
rationing, or more generally, nancial constraints. This approach has been introduced by
Fazzari et al . (1988). They use cash-ow as a proxy for the availability of internal funds;
the hypothesis to be tested is that investment of rms that are rationed on credit markets
is more sensitive to variations of internal funds than the investment of rms that are not
subject to credit constraints. The investment equation basically explains investment as a
function of Tobin's (marginal) q (i. e., the ratio of rm value and capital stock) which is
the central determinant of rm investment in standard neoclassical models, and cash ow.
The sample is split into three subsamples according to the dividend payout ratio. This
allows to test whether the investment of low-payout rms is sensitive to the availability of
internal funds because they are constrained on markets for outside nance. Very broadly
speaking, Fazzari et al. nd that nancing constraints in capital markets aect investment.
The validity of standard reduced-form models of rm investment has been questioned
by many studies in recent years. An alternative to reduced-form estimation is to derive
testable relationships from structural models of rm behavior. The resulting intertemporal
optimality conditions (Euler equations) link marginal adjustment costs in adjacent periods
and do not depend on the unobserved shadow value of capital that enters Tobin's q. Such
structural models have been used to test for the eects of nancial constraints as well,
mostly conrming their existence; examples are papers by Whited (1992) and Bond and
Meghir (1994). Leaving the econometric problems of reduced-form and structural models
of rm investment aside, the central empirical issue in this literature is the identication
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of nancially constrained rms. I take up this point next, before turning to the role of
endogenous market exit decisions and aggregation biases.
2.1 Identication of nancially constrained rms
A broad characterization of nancially constrained rms is that their costs of external
funds are higher than their costs of internal funds (i. e., cash ow). Starting with the
seminal paper by Fazzari et al . (1988), many empirical tests of the sensitivity of investment
to the availability of internal funds use sample-split approaches to identify nancially
constrained rms. The criterion used by Fazzari et al . (1988) is the rm's dividend-income
ratio. The rationale is that \if the cost disadvantage of external funds is large, it should
have the greatest eect on rms that retain most of their income. If the cost disadvantage
is slight, then retention practices should reveal little about nancing practices, q values,
or investment behavior." (p. 158) Using the dividend-income ratio criterion, they divide
their sample of 422 rms (those continuously contained in the Valueline database over the
1970{84 period) into three subsamples. The classication scheme is reproduced in Table
1.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) criticize both the theoretical foundation of the test strategy
proposed by Fazzari et al . (1988) and the empirical implementation of the sample-split
criterion. They argue that the fundamental assumption of this literature, namely that
the investment-cash ow sensitivity (tested by either reduced-form or structural methods)
increases monotonically with the degree of nancing constraints, is theoretically ill-posed.
While it is clear that a nancially constrained rm's investment should be sensitive to
internal cash ow and an unconstrained rm's investment should not, it is not clear that
the degree of this sensitivity should vary with the degree of nancial constraints. Given
that investment of the vast majority of rms analyzed by Fazzari et al . (1988) is sensitive
to cash ow, this monotonicity assumption is crucial for standard sample-split approaches
to be valid.
The central idea of Kaplan and Zingales's (1997) approach is to construct an ordinal
measure for the nancial status of rms that conveys more information than the sample-
split approach. Their scheme \is designed to distinguish relative dierences in the degree
to which rms are nancially constrained" (p. 173); they use a variety of sources \to
derive as complete a picture as possible of the availability if internal and external funds
for each rm as well as each rm's demand for funds." (p. 170) In addition to standard
balance-sheet information such as leverage and cash ow, they use complementary sources
of information. These are management's letters to the shareholders, the discussion of
liquidity and nancial status in annual reports, the 10-K reports that most publicly traded
corporations in the U.S. have to le annually with the SEC, and other sources such as
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publicly available news pieces (taken from the Wall Street Journal Index). In the 10-
K reports, for example, rms are explicitly required to discuss their liquidity, capital
resources, and results of operations.
Kaplan and Zingales use this information to construct an ordinal indicator that groups
each rm-year observation into one of ve categories (the exact denitions are listed in
Table 2). The 49 rms considered by Kaplan and Zingales are those classied as nancially
constrained by FHP because of their low dividend-income ratios, i. e., the 49 Class 1 rms
in Table 1.
Insert Table 2 about here.
The most important result of this new classication scheme is that surprisingly few rms
are nancially constrained, both on an annual basis and over the entire sample period.
Table 2 shows that less than 15% of all rm-year observations are classied as possibly,
likely, or denitely nancially constrained. Based on this annual nancial status indicator,
Kaplan and Zingales also assign the 49 rms to three groups according to their overall
nancial situation over the entire 1970{84 period. Kaplan and Zingales nd 19 rms
to be not or likely not nancially constrained over the entire sample period, while only
22 rms (less than half of the sample) have some years during which they were likely
nancially constrained or denitely nancially constrained. The main nding reported
by Kaplan and Zingales is that those rms they classify as less nancially constrained
show higher sensitivities of investment to cash ow. In Kaplan and Zingales's view, this
result contradicts the results of existing empirical studies which argue that investment is
sensitive to internal nance when a rm is nancially constrained.
An interesting feature of Kaplan and Zingales's classication scheme is the fact that the
nancial status variable varies over time. It turns out that the nancial status histories of
the 49 rms in the sample are quite heterogenous. For example, even most Group 3 rms
have spells during which they were not classied as being nancially constrained or likely
nancially constrained. These observations highlight the fact that a time-varying measure
such as the nancial status indicator by Kaplan and Zingales conveys much more detailed
information about rms' nancial situation than standard sample-split approaches.
The nancial status variable constructed by Kaplan and Zingales has been criticized for
a number of reasons.
3
First of all, the classication scheme is highly judgemental, and as
no specic guidelines for the classication were reported by Kaplan and Zingales, their
approach is dicult to replicate for other samples of rms. Arguably, the most important
question that arises is whether in the data sources used by Kaplan and Zingales, managers
3
See the response by Fazzari et al . (1996). Note that this response was based on an earlier version of
the paper, Kaplan and Zingales (1995). In the published version, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) address
some, but not all, of the concerns brought forth by Fazzari et al.
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report truthfully on their nancial status.
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Also, Fazzari et al. argue that the criterion
emphasizes nancial distress rather than nancing constraints. A more general objection
by Fazzari et al. is that given the problems they see with the denition of the nancial
status indicator, Kaplan and Zingales make unrealistically ne distinctions in the rm's
availability of nance. In particular, they question whether there is enough time variation
in rms' nancial policies to warrant the use and interpretation of an annual nancial
status variable. Finally, Fazzari et al. raise some doubts about the econometric results
obtained by Kaplan and Zingales using their new indicator. (However, this objection is
not related to the indicator itself, but rather to econometric problems.)
Despite these objections, it seems worthwhile to further investigate the new indicator
variable constructed by Kaplan and Zingales. In particular, it will be interesting to see
whether variations in this variable over the sample period help to explain rms' investment
decisions. Such a nding would conrm that the new variable contains useful information
about rms' nancial status and that nancial status { as dened and measured by Kaplan
and Zingales { indeed aects investment.
2.2 The role of endogenous exit decisions
When models of rm investment are estimated using panel data, the researcher usually
faces some sort of panel attrition, resulting in unbalanced panels. There are several
reasons for panel attrition: A rm or plant might leave a market or go bankrupt, it may
be sold to a new owner, or rm representatives might just refuse to ll in questionnaires
any more. Only the last event can reasonably be considered exogenous (although in some
instances there might be some sort of endogeneity involved). All other forms of panel
attrition must be considered endogenous (non-random) events.
The resulting selection problems are clearly relevant in empirical studies of investment
and nancial constraints. For example, most existing studies use panels of continuing
rms, excluding any exits from the analysis, although exit might well be endogenous with
respect to nancial status. A crude approach to deal with this issue is to ignore the
selection problem when estimating the model, but to assess the direction of the resulting
biases when interpreting the results. For example, Chirinko and Schaller (1995) { in a
panel study of Canadian rms { note that \by eliminating rms for which data are not
available for the entire sample period, we may introduce a survivor bias. Since survivors
will tend to underrepresent young rms who are more likely to face information problems
in capital markets, our procedure tends to be biased against nding evidence of nance
constraints" (p. 529). Such an argument suggests that many studies tend to reject the null
hypothesis of no nancial constraints correctly despite the biases introduced by ignoring
4
For a variety of reasons, Kaplan and Zingales do not consider misreporting a serious problem for their
research design, see p. 182 of their paper for details.
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panel exits. Still, it would be interesting to see just how important this eect is, especially
when policy recommendations are derived.
Anything which goes beyond these ad hoc approaches requires an explicit theory of market
entry and exit decisions and a structural estimation strategy (see Abowd et al . (1995) for a
detailed discussion). When empirical work is based on an explicit theory of entry and exit,
unbalanced panels (reecting observed market entries or exits) provide the opportunity
to gain a more complete understanding of rm dynamics. There are only few empirical
studies that are rmly based on such models. One example of a structural model of the
survival process is Olley and Pakes (1996). Based on the model of industry dynamics
by Ericson and Pakes (1995), they investigate productivity and exit dynamics in the
U.S. telecommunications equipment industry, using semiparametric methods to correct
for attrition bias in their productivity estimates. Winter (1997) has estimated a dynamic
programming model of plant-level investment and exit decisions with the same LRD-based
dataset as used in this paper, nding evidence for real eects of rm-level nancial status.
There is also an older (and larger) empirical literature on the determinants of rms'
market exits which uses reduced-form approaches (see Siegfried and Evans (1994) for a
comprehensive overview). Among others, Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988, 1989)
provide empirical evidence on the importance of entry and exit decisions for the analysis
of rm (and industry) dynamics. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) analyze the eects of
nancial restructuring on rms' investment and market exit decisions using a reduced-
form approach. Taken together, this literature suggests that it is important to account for
endogenous exits when analyzing the eects of nancial status on investment decisions.
2.3 Aggregation biases in empirical investment models
In most studies of rm behavior, aggregation biases are a problem. In standard investment
theory, it is assumed that a rm chooses the level of overall investment spending (possibly
subject to nancial or other constraints). In reality, however, investment and exit decisions
are usually made for individual projects (e. g., products, product ranges, or plants), and
they are { at least partially { based on the productivity of each individual project. Hence,
the desireable level of aggregation for empirical studies of investment decisions is the single
investment project. However, only in rare cases are such detailed datasets available to
the researcher, and if they are, the availability of variables might restrict the scope of
empirical studies to very specic (though often economically very interesting) questions.
The next level of aggregation is the plant (or establishment) level. The question whether
using even plant-level data introduces aggregation biases has a clear theoretical answer
(yes), but it should be viewed mainly as an empirical question. In many cases, the
production of a single plant will be very focused, so that plant investment decisions can
still be viewed as a reasonable approximation to individual investment projects. It is an
empirical question whether aggregation biases from using rm-level data are of relevance.
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There is a growing literature on this issue, and the overwhelming conclusion is that the
dynamics of (among others) investment, labor demand, and job creation and destruction
are much richer at the plant level than at the rm level.
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Given that the plant-level is
the lowest level of aggregation at which datasets for broad samples of the manufacturing
sector are available, the safest choice is to use such plant-level data whenever possible.
In this study, I want to avoid such aggregation problems by looking at plant-level decisions
of rms. There are a number of data requirements for empirical studies of joint investment
and exit decisions. For example, when market exit decisions are central to an empirical
study, rm or plant exits from the panel must be well documented. In particular, market
exit can take two distinct forms, either plant closure or plant sell-o. These should be
distinguished in the data. This is the case for the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD)
used in this paper, but not for many other datasets where in both cases rms would just
be dropped from the panel. Unfortunately, plant-level datasets such as the LRD usually
do not contain nancial variables. Hence, for investigating the eect of rms' nancial
situation on investment, it is necessary to link plant-level and rm-level data. How this
has been done in this paper is discussed in the next section.
3 A new empirical approach based on plant-level data
The central idea of the empirical approach used in this paper is to combine rm-level
nancial data and plant-level production and investment data to test whether the nancial
situation of a rm inuences its investment decisions (as observed at the plant level).
Using these dierent levels of aggregation requires an empirical model of nance and
investment decisions within an existing rm.
3.1 The empirical model of rms' decisions
At the rm level, the rm chooses its nancing policies, resulting in its current capital
structure. Outside borrowing might by subject to credit constraints, and for some rms,
raising equity might be dicult as well. Either problem would result in nancial con-
straints at the rm level. In addition to these outside sources of nance, the rm can also
use its cash ow to nance investment. This model takes the rm's nancial decisions
and any outside restrictions as given; hence the rm's capital structure is exogenous to
the model. This is a standard approach in the theoretical and empirical literature on in-
tertemporal investment decisions under nancial constraints. While such an assumption
is not entirely satisfying theoretically, it is dicult to explicitly include a rm's nancing
decisions under asymmetric information in a dynamic model of investment decisions (see,
5
See Davis et al . (1996) for an overview of this literature and many empirical results.
8
e. g., Milne and Robertson (1996)). Further, the model assumes that aggregated (rm-
level) cash ow is exogenous at the plant level. This assumption is clearly restrictive; its
implications are discussed below. Under these assumptions, the rm's nancial decisions
can be treated as a black box in the empirical model, and its nancial situation can be
described by variables observed at the rm level. In this study, these variables are leverage
(the ratio of long-term debt to total assets), cash ow, and the nancial status indicator
developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
Given its nancial status, the rm makes its operating and investment decisions, i. e., it
allocates funds to the individual plants for capital investment. If the rm is not nancially
constrained, these decisions will be the solutions to individual intertemporal optimization
problems for each plant. The capital stock installed at each plant is then a quasi-xed
factor, and output and factor input decisions are made at the plant level, given the capital
stock and factor prices. This model of plant-level investment and production decisions uses
only variables observed at the plant level: investment (and the resulting capital stock),
variable inputs, and output. If, however, the rm is nancially constrained, rm-level
nancial variables should be signicant in the plant-level regressions, i. e., nancial status
aects plant-level investment after controlling for other determinants such as productivity
and expected market demand. This is the central empirical idea used in this study.
In general, plant-level investment and production decisions also determine plant-level cash
ows which can be aggregated to rm-level cash ow. Firm-level cash ow, in turn, is a
major component of the rm's nancial situation, and it enters the plant-level regressions
both directly and through its eect on the rm-level nancial status variable. Hence,
rm-level nancial variables should properly be treated as endogenous in the plant-level
model of investment and exit decisions. There are two major diculties with this (and
thus the current specication of the model treats rm-level nancial status as exogenous
at the plant level).
First, taking account of this endogeneity in the structual econometric model would require
to implement some plant-level expectation mechanism for next period's rm-level nancial
situation, which in turn would depend on all plants' cash ows. Current theories of
rms' internal nance (e. g., Gertner et al . (1994) and Stein (1997)) do not oer any
clear-cut advice how this interdependence should enter an empircal model of plant-level
operating and investment decisions. In any case, plant-level investment decisions could
not be treated individually, and the resulting modications would make it dicult to
estimate the model. Implicitly, the model assumes that the allocation of funds is sticky
across plants, i. e., if the rm moves into a nancially constrained state, this restriction
is transmitted uniformely to all plants. This assumption is consistent with the empirical
ndings of Shin and Stulz (1996).
The second problem is related to the data sources used in this study. As will become clear
in the next section, data are available only for all manufacturing plants that belong to a
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given rm. It is however likely that large rms generate cash ow from non-manufacturing
sources as well. The importance of these sources would be dicult to assess in practice,
but it could eectively wash out an individual plant's eect on rm-level nancial status.
Lamont (1997), for example, presents a case study that illustrates how shocks to rm-level
nancial status aect investment across very dierent operations of a large corporation.
Both problems together imply that the exogeneity assumption for rm-level nancial sta-
tus is dicult to relax if investment and production data are at the plant level. However,
the advantages of using plant-level data in the analysis of investment decisions seem to
justify imposing such strong assumptions.
3.2 Matching rm and plant-level data
The main source of data used in this study is the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD)
maintained by the Center for Economic Studies (CES) at the U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, Washington, D.C. All plant-level nominal investment, variable factor demand and
output data as well as the information on plant operating status were obtained from the
LRD. This section concentrates on the selection of rms and plants for the estimation
dataset and presents some descriptive statistics. For a discussion of data sources and the
construction of variables used, see the Data Appendix.
The 49 rms contained in Kaplan and Zingales's sample were matched with LRD plants
using a name matching procedure. In total, data on plants owned by 40 of these 49 rms
were matched with LRD plant-level data.
6
The resulting raw sample with 3989 plant-
year observations was then cleaned. Table 3 contains details of the data cleaning process.
First, spells with just one observation were dropped; then, the rst year of each remaining
spell was excluded. (This is due to the fact that the rst year of each spell is used to
construct state variables for the following year.) Finally, plant-year observations with zero
output or input were dropped, and the sample was trimmed for outliers.
7
The resulting
panel has 444 plants with 573 distinct spells and a total of 3014 plant-year observations
(see Table 4). A surprisingly large fraction (almost 30%) of these plant spells ends with
a plant exit (exit is dened as the plant being either closed or sold to another rm).
Insert Table 3 about here.
Insert Table 4 about here.
Table 5 reports the distribution of plant spells. Note that the observed spells are actually
one year longer because the rst plant-year observation in each spell is used to construct
6
For condentiality reasons, the names of these 40 rms cannot be disclosed; neither can a number of
otherwise desireable descriptive statistics on the matched sub-sample of rms be reported.
7
An observation was excluded if any of the following ratios was above the 99.5 percentile of the re-
spective ratio's sample distribution: output/labor, output/materials, output/capital, capital/labor,
investment/capital. Outliers in these ratios typically indicate errors in one of the variables involved.
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the second year's state variables. As one can see, there is a fairly large number of plant
spells which cover the whole 12-year period (1973{84), but there are also many very
short spells. Many of these short spells occur in the early years of the dataset; these
spells are potentially much longer, but the full plant history cannot be observed due to
left-truncation. In the model used in this study, left-truncation is not a serious problem
because all historic information is contained in the current period's state variables (which
are actually lagged values). The only critical variable, then, is plant age, but as discussed
in the Data Appendix, one can use some information on plant age from the LRD which
goes back to the years before 1972 (the rst year in which the other variables are observed).
Insert Table 5 about here.
The original Kaplan-Zingales rm-level sample contains 49 rms with 729 rm-year ob-
servations for 1970{84.
8
As the annual coverage of the LRD starts in 1972, the sample
period for the plant-level data is shorter, covering 13 years instead of 15. Table 6 reports
on the results of the matching process, in particular, the distribution of the nancial sta-
tus variable in the full sample with 49 rms and among the 40 rms for which LRD plant
information was available. It is regrettable that the small sample of 49 rms was further
reduced to only 40 rms, but the resulting sample still has (roughly) the same proportions
of rms classied by Kaplan and Zingales as nancially constrained and not constrained,
respectively. Although I am unable to report further details due to disclosure restrictions,
this observation suggests that the resulting sample still has enough variation in its yearly
nancial status indicator.
Insert Table 6 about here.
To analyze the plant-level operating decisions of rms, two discrete indicator variables are
used. Table 7 summarizes the denitions and sample distributions of these two variables.
The rst variable takes four values and reects the plant's operating status, i. e., whether
the plant is in normal operation, idle, closed or sold in the current year. The operating
status is an ordinal concept that is slightly more general than the standard binary plant
exit (closure) decision, and exploits the information on operating decisions that is available
in the LRD database. The second variable characterizes the investment regime, it takes
two values. The rationale for using a discretized version of the investment variable is that
investment has been shown to quite lumpy at the plant-level (e. g., Cooper et al . (1995)).
In investment regime 0, a rm allows the capital stock at a plant to deteriorate at its rate
of physical depreciation by not undertaking any replacement investment.
9
In investment
regime 1, the rm decides to replace depreciated capital at least to some extend, while
8
Six rm-year observations (for two rms that entered the panel after 1970) are missing in their data.
9
The threshold level of 10% for classifying a plant as being in regime 0 is arbitrary, but varying this
value does not change the results substantially. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) use a similar approach,
with a binary investment variable that takes the value 1 if a rm increases is capital expenditure by 5
% or more in a given year.
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in investemt regime 2, the rm does actually increase the plant's capital stock (i. e., net
investment).
Insert Table 7 about here.
Table 8 reports the distribution of plant-year observations across operating status and
nancial status. This table contains all plant-year observations in the sample; one can see
that there is a tendency for idle plants and exits (i. e., closures or sell-os) to concentrate
in years with a more constrained nancial status. This fact is exploited in the econometric
analysis presented below, where exit decisions are shown to depend, after controlling for
productivity and expected demand eects, on nancial status.
Insert Table 8 about here.
Finally, Table 9 contains correlation coecients of the nancial status indicator con-
structed by Kaplan and Zingales and other variables typically considered in theoretical
and empirical studies on the eects of rms' nancial situation on its investment decisions
(computed for the 40 rm sample over the entire 1972{84 period). As can be seen from
the table, the correlations are far from perfect, which suggests that the Kaplan and Zin-
gales variable indeed contains information other than that used in standard models. The
correlations, however, have the expected sign: High-leverage rms tend to be classied as
being nancially constrained and rms with large cash ows tend to be classied as not
being constrained acccording to Kaplan and Zingales.
Insert Table 9 about here.
4 Econometric analysis of plant-level investment and exit deci-
sions
The empirical models of plant growth presented in this section are simple econometric
devices that allow to analyze the implications of standard intertemporal optimization
models of plant dynamics.
10
At the same time, they can be used to test whether rm-
level nancial variables aect these real decisions. The analysis starts with the estimation
of a plant-level production function which is used to construct measures of (relative) pro-
ductivity. The rst group of substantive results are probit and ordered probit regressions
that analyze the determinants of a plant's operating decision (i. e., whether a plant is in
normal operation, idle, sold or closed). If the plant is either sold or closed, the rm has
made an exit decision for that plant. The second group of results are for a model that
explains investment decisions (in levels) and at the same time corrects for selection bias
10
A more detailed analysis of plant-level investment and market exit decisions can be found in Winter
(1997).
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that arises because exit decisions are endogenous, using the standard sample selection
framework introduced by Heckman (1979).
4.1 Plant-level production functions and productivity indexes
The empirical analysis builds on a production function regression with capital, labor, and
materials as inputs, and with a time index to capture technical progress. The residuals
from these regressions are used as measures of productivity in subsequent regressions.
Note that this productivity index measures relative productivity (relative to the industry
mean). This concept has been used widely in the plant-level productivity research (see,
e. g., Doms et al . (1995)). The regression equation is given by:
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where y is output, k is capital, l is labor, m is materials, and  is the error term. The
results of alternative production function specications are contained in Table 10. Gener-
ally, signs and magnitudes of the coecients of the production functions are as expected
(according to standard applied production analysis). The specication used to construct
the productivity index from estimated residuals is reported the last column (Translog II).
Insert Table 10 about here.
4.2 Determinants of plants-level operating and investment regimes
This section contains regression results for discrete variables that characterize a rm's
plant-level operating decisions (for the denition of these variables, see Table 7). Ex-
planatory variables contained in all regressions include capital stock (as a measure of
plant size), plant age, the (relative) productivity index described above, and the capi-
tal/labor ratio as a measure of technology. These variables are standarad in productivity
analysis and capture the inuence of \real" factors that determine a plant's operating
status (e. g., Doms et al . (1995)). Experiments with other sets of variables did not deliver
results that were substantially dierent from those reported here.
The most important decision that is available to the rm is the operating regime. Tables
11 and 12 contain ordered probit regressions of plants' operating status. Table 11 contains
results for all 3014 plant-year observations, while the regressions in Table 12 are for the
last observed year of each plant spell only, to highlight the exit eects (here, the total
number of observations is 573). The interesting nding here is that including rm-level
nancial variables generally increases the model's ability to explain plant-level operating
decisions. The nancial status indicator proposed by Kaplan and Zingales, however, is
insignicant in all equations, while the cash-ow variable is signicant { even though we
include the Kaplan-Zingales variable to control for rm-level nancial status.
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Insert Table 11 about here.
Insert Table 12 about here.
The second decision a rm has for its plants is the investment regime. Table 13 contains
the results of ordered probit regressions of the plant-level investment regime. In the
investment regressions, however, rm-level nancial variables play a much stronger role.
The cash-ow/assets ratio has a strong positive eect on plant-level investment. The
debt/assets ratio has an insignicant negative eect as in the operating status equation,
but it is somewhat stronger, and negative, as expected. The Kaplan-Zingales indicator
has a signicant eect if no other rm-level nancial variables are included, and in this
case, it has a negative sign, as would be expected. I will return to the interpretation of
the results for the Kaplan-Zingales indicator variable in the concluding section.
Insert Table 13 about here.
4.3 An empirical model of joint investment and exit decisions
The model used here to analyze rms' joint investment and exit decisions at the plant level
is one of the earliest attempts to address the selection problem in applied econometric
work. There are now many more sophisticated models available, and Heckman's (1979)
model was chosen mainly for its simplicity and its intuitive appeal. It has also been used
in other studies of rm growth and survival (such as Doms et al . (1995)). The model
consists of two equations, a plant exit equation and a plant growth equation:
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The explanatory variables are collected, together with a constant, in the vector x; they
are the same as in the operating status regressions reported previously. The investment
equation also has the inverse Mill's ratio as a right-hand side variable, which allows to
control for the probability of exit in a given plant year; () and () are the p.d.f. and c.d.f.
of the Normal distribution, respectively. The plant exit equation is formulated as a binary
Probit model, while the investment equation is estimated using OLS. It should be noted
that identication of the parameters in the two-equation system given by (2) and (3) relies
on the non-linearity (in x) of the Mill's ratio that enters (3) as an additional regressor (and
on the assumption that the errors 
1i
and 
2i
are jointly normally distributed, which is
essentially untestable). In general, identication could also be achieved by imposing some
exclusion restriction on either equation. In the application considered here, however, the
underlying model of rm investment and exit implies that the driving forces of investment
and exit are the same.
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Table 14 contains the estimates of the plant exit equations, while Table 15 contains the
results for the plant investment equations. Generally, the estimation of the parameters
in both equations turned out to be relatively precise, but the productivity variable did
not have any signicant eect on exit and investment decisions. The results for the
Kaplan-Zingales indicator are interesting: If no other nancial variables are included, it is
insignicant. If other nancial variables are included, it is signicant, but does not have
the expected sign: Firms that are classied as being constrained in a given year are less
likely to exit and invest more, according to these results. Again, I return to the discussion
of how these results should be interpreted in the conclusions.
Insert Table 14 about here.
Insert Table 15 about here.
5 Conclusions
On balance, the empirical results reported in this paper conrm the nding in much of
the existing literature on the eects of nancial status on ivestment: They exist. Here,
this result was obtained using a new measure of the rm's nancial status which reects
more information than simple sample-split approaches. This result was obtained from a
reduced-form model of rm decisions that was designed to account for endogenous exit
decisions, a problem usually ignored in similar studies. In the sample used here, exits
are important: Almost 30% of plant spells end with an exit (i. e., either plant closure or
sell-o).
One of the main goals of this paper was to assess the empirical performance of the nancial
status indicator variable proposed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). The variable turned
out to be insignicant in all plant-level operating and investment equations that were
estimated. However, if other nancial variables were included, they were in most cases
signicant and of the expected sign: low rm-level debt-to-asset ratios and high rm-
level cash ows increase plant-level investment and decrease the likelihood of exits (plant
closures or sell-os). These eects were uniformly stronger for cash ow. This result
conrms many earlier studies of investment: Cash ow is a strong predictor of investment
activities. Moreover, this result was obtained even after controlling for rm-level nancial
status as measured by Kaplan and Zingales. Taken together, these results add more
empirical evidence to the hypothesis that nancial status aect investment, or as this
study has shown, that rm-level nancial status aects plant-level investment and exit
decisions.
A major concern with the empirical implementation here is sample size. While the size
of the sample is fairly large in terms of individual plants covered, the number of rms is
small. This is mainly due the fact that the nancial status indicator had been constructed
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for a very small sample in the rst place. To construct measures of rms' nancial status
for larger panels of rms must be left to future research. One recent alternative to using
indirect measures of rms' nancial status is to construct a direct measure, using data
on the actual underwriting cost of issuing new equity (see Calomiris and Himmelberg
(1998)). It would be interesting to see how such alternative measures of nancial status
work in these models.
Given the results of this study, I would argue that the central problem of empirical tests
of nancial constraints is not so much the proper measurement of rms' nancial status,
rather it is the formulation of the theoretical and empirical model of rm investment.
While this study has attempted to address aggregation issues and endogenous exit deci-
sions, it has used very strong assumptions about the intra-rm allocation of funds. This is
clearly an issue that needs to addressed in future work on the interaction of outside and in-
side nance at the rm level, and investment and exit decisions at the plant level. Finally,
an alternative, and theoretically preferrable, econometric approach to the reduced-form
models used here would be to use a structural model of rm's joint investment and exit
decisions (see Winter (1997) for an attempt in that direction). In such a model, one
could make rm-level nancial variables endogenous, say, by including nancial assets as
a state variable in the optimization model, as suggested by Pakes (1994). This task is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper. Also, neither would such a model be amenable
to structural estimation given current techniques, nor do databases exist with sucient
information both on production and investment decisions and on nancial variables.
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Data Appendix
This appendix contains details on the sources of data and on the construction of variables
used in this paper.
A.1 Sources of plant, rm, and industry-level data
The main source of data is the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) maintained by the
Center for Economic Studies (CES) at the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C.
The information on individual establishments contained in the LRD is condential and
protected by Title 13, U.S. Code, which species that the Census Bureau may not publish
or release any data provided by individual respondents to censuses and other Census
Bureau surveys. Hence, all work using LRD plant-level data has to be conducted on site
at the CES, and all research output is reviewed by CES sta for violation of disclosure
rules. In particular, these procedures are designed to ensure that no information on any
individual plant or rm can be reconstructed from released research output. For a detailed
description of the LRD, see McGuckin and Pascoe (1988) and the technical appendix in
Davis et al . (1996).
The LRD contains annual cost and output data on manufacturing establishments (plants)
based on the quinquennial Census of Manufactures (CM) conducted in the years 1963,
1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992. For the remaining (henceforth, non-census)
years since 1972, the LRD contains information obtained through the Annual Survey
of Manufactures (ASM). The datales for the individual years can be linked to form
an unbalanced longitudinal panel, with annual observations ranging from 1972 through,
currently, 1993. The number of plants in the CM is about 300,000{400,000, covering all
but the smallest manufacturing establishments in the U.S. In non-census years, data are
available only for a probability sample of about 50,000{70,000 plants taken from the CM.
While all large establishments (over 250 employees) are included in the ASM, smaller
plants are included in the ASM panel with probability increasing with plant size. These
establishments, in turn, are included only for ve years; then, a new sample of ASM
establishments is drawn for the next ve years (resulting in a rotating ve year panel).
Hence, there are only few small establishments in consecutive AMS years. In general, this
will lead to some selection biases for small establishments.
After the plant-level variables were retrieved from the LRD for the rms considered in this
study, they were augmented with nancial variables recorded at the rm level and with
price indexes and depreciation rates recorded at the industry level. For the set of rms
identied as being nancially constrained by Fazzari et al . (1988) and further investigated
by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), the values of the annual nancial status variable were
taken verbatim from the appendix in Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Further details on the
nancial status variable can be found in Section 2. Other rm-level nancial variables
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used in this study are based on publicly available balance-sheet information. They were
extracted from the NBER Manufacturing Masterle (see Hall (1990)) which in turn is
based on rms' balance-sheet data contained in the Compustat database. All rm-level
nancial variables were matched with LRD plant-level variables using a name matching
procedure.
Deators for the various output and input measures used in this study are taken, at
the 4-digit industry level, from the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database (see
Bartelsman and Gray (1994) for details). These annual deators have 1987 as their base
year, hence all real variables used in this study are expressed in terms of 1987 dollars.
The annual capital depreciation rates used for constructing capital stocks are based on the
2-digit industry level. They were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
The method used by BEA for constructing the underlying industry-specic capital input
measures is, in turn, the same as that used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in their
productivity studies; see Hulten and Wyko (1981), U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1983)
and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1984) for detailed discussions.
A.2 Construction of variables
Discrete operating decision The LRD contains detailed information on the operating
status of a given plant in each year. In particular, this \coverage code" allows to identify
plants that were closed permanently or experienced ownership changes. The denition of
the operating status variable is discussed in Section 3 in detail; see also Table 7.
Real investment The investment variable is constructed by adding the LRD variables
for equipment and structures investment. For the denition of the discrete investment
regime variable, see Section 3 and Table 7. Conversion to 1987 Dollars uses the deators
discussed above.
Real capital stock The capital stock measures are constructed for equipment capital
and building structures separately; only after all the following adjustments have been
made are these two components added to yield a single real capital stock variable. Initial
capital stocks (used in the rst year a plant is observed in the sample) are constructed
from the book values reported in the LRD. For the remaining years, a perpetual inventory
method with time-varying annual depreciation factors is used. This method is considered
to be more reliable than the standard approach which amounts to picking a more or less
arbitrary depreciaction rate (such as, say, 10%) and leaving it constant over time and
across industries. Conversion to 1987 Dollars uses the deators discussed above.
Plant age For plants that were established after 1972, age (in years) is straightforward
to construct. For older plants (i. e., plants observed in the LRD in 1972 and not reported
to be newly established in that year), the LRD records for the years 1963 and 1967 were
checked. If a plant was already in operation in these years, it is classied as being 10
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or 5 years old, respectively, in 1972. This method reduces the bias introduced by left-
truncation of plant histories, but of course cannot remove it entirely.
Financial status variables These rm-level variables are taken verbatim from Kaplan
and Zingales (1997, Appendix), and from the NBER Manufacturing Masterle.
Real output and real variable factor inputs These variables are constructed from
the respective nominal LRD variables, applying the standard variable denitions used by
LRD researchers. They are then converted to 1987 Dollars using the deators discussed
above. Plant-level output is dened as the total value of shipments, adjusted for inventory
changes.
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Table 1: The sample-split criterion used by Fazzari et al . (1988)
Category Dividend-income ratio Firms
1 Less than 10%
a
49 11.6 %
2 Between 10% and 20%
a
39 9.2 %
3 20% and above 334 79.1 %
Total 422
Source: Fazzari et al . (1988), Table 2.
a
For at least 10 years.
Table 2: The nancial status indicator by Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
Category Financial status (annual) Firm years
a
0 Not nancially constrained 389 53.4%
1 Likely not nancially constrained 233 32.0%
2 Possibly nancially constrained 53 7.3%
3 Likely nancially constrained 34 4.7%
4 Financially constrained 20 2.7%
Total 729
Source: Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Appendix.
a
Six rm years (1970{73 for Commodore Intl. Ltd. and 1970{71 for James River Corp.) are missing in
the Kaplan-Zingales sample, so the total number of rm-year observations is 49 15  6 = 729.
Table 3: Details of the data cleaning process
Observations
Raw sample 3989
Single observation spells 169
First observation of each remaining spell 573
Plant-years with zero output or input 160
Plant-years lost due to outlier trimming 73
Cleaned sample (nal panel) 3014
Source: Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of the Census; and own calculations.
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Table 4: Sample characteristics
Raw sample Cleaned sample
a
Firms 40 40
Plants 514 444
Operating status: sold 176 34.2% 100 22.5%
Operating status: closed 86 16.7% 30 6.8%
Total exits 262 59.0% 130 29.3%
Plant spells 742 573
Plant-year observations 3989 3014
Source: Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of the Census; and own calculations.
a
The cleaned sample is the sample used for estimation.
Table 5: Distribution of plant spell lengths
Years Plants
1 92 16.1%
2 83 14.5%
3 61 10.7%
4 56 9.8%
5 35 6.1%
6 68 11.9%
7 27 4.7%
8 25 4.4%
9 19 3.3%
10 30 5.2%
11 18 3.1%
12 59 10.3%
Total 573
Source: Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of the Census; and own calculations.
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Table 6: Distribution of rm-level nancial status
a
Kaplan-Zingales Sample matched
Financial status sample with LRD data
b
Not or likely not constrained 19 38.8% 16 40.0%
Possibly constrained 8 16.3%
)
24 60.0%
Likely or denitely constrained 22 44.9%
Total 49 40
Source: Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Appendix; Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of
the Census; and own calculations.
a
The nancial constraints status reported in this table is Kaplan and Zingales's classication of rms
for the entire sample period, not the annual indicator variable used elsewhere in this study.
b
Due to disclosure restrictions, values for some individual cells based on LRD plant-level data cannot
be reported; these cells have been collapsed pairwise in this table.
Table 7: Discrete operating status and investment variables
Category Operating status (last observed year of each plant spell) Plants
0 Plant in normal operation (positive output) 395 68.9 %
1 Plant idle (zero output) 48 8.4 %
2 Plant sold 100 17.5 %
3 Plant permanently closed 30 5.2 %
Total 573
Category Investment regime (all plant years) Plant years
0 Investment less than 10% of physical depreciation 281 9.3 %
1 Investment between 10% and 100% of physical depreciation 1086 36.0 %
2 Investment above 100% of physical depreciation 1647 54.6 %
Total 3014
Source: Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of the Census; and own calculations.
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Table 8: Plant operating status and rm-level nancial status
Total Operating Not operating
a
KZI Total Idle Sold Closed
0 1976 65.6% 1854 65.4% 122 68.5% 30 74 18
1 651 21.6% 622 21.9% 29 16.3% 7 17 5
2 196 6.5% 182 6.4% 14 7.9%
3 102 3.4% 94 3.3% 8 4.5%
4 89 3.0% 84 3.0% 5 2.8%
Total 3014 100.0% 2836 100.0% 178 100.0%
Source: Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Appendix; Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of
the Census; and own calculations.
a
Due to disclosure restrictions, values for some individual cells based on LRD plant-level data cannot
be reported.
Table 9: Correlations among alternative measures of rms' nancial status
correlation P-value
Kaplan-Zingales indicator vs. Debt-assets ratio 0.1678 0.0010
Kaplan-Zingales indicator vs. Cash ow-assets ratio -0.1782 0.0005
Cash ow-assets ratio vs. Debt-assets ratio -0.2316 0.0000
Source: Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Appendix; NBER Manufacturing Masterle; and own calculations.
Notes : Correlations are based on all rm years in the estimation sample; if the (ordinal) Kaplan-Zingales
nancial constraints indicator variable is included, Spearman's rank correlation coecient is reported.
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Table 10: Plant-level production function equations (OLS estimates)
Specication Cobb-Douglas Translog I Translog II
Constant 0.157 ( 0.55) 0.213 ( 0.76) -0.131 (-0.68)
Time 0.018 ( 4.89) 0.017 ( 4.60) 0.015 ( 6.22)
Capital, K 0.170 (13.93) 0.253 (15.58) -0.068 (-4.68)
Labor, L 0.689 (44.84) 0.711 (38.15) 0.496 (25.28)
Materials, M 0.520 (29.48)
K K 0.035 ( 4.45) -0.012 (-2.05)
L L 0.048 ( 4.32) 0.090 ( 8.91)
M M 0.045 ( 5.84)
K  L -0.024 (-1.79)
K M 0.057 ( 5.09)
LM -0.156 (-11.86)
Observations 3014 3014 3014
Total SS 5451.3 5451.3 5451.3
Residual SS 1297.9 1256.8 578.6
R
2
0.762 0.769 0.894
Probability of F -Test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of the Census; and own calculations.
Note: t-values in parentheses. The regressions also contain industry dummies; parameter estimates for
these are not reported here.
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Table 11: Operating status equations (ordered probit estimates)
Specication I II III
Capital -0.008 (-5.21) -0.008 (-5.26) -0.007 (-4.56)
Plant age 0.013 (1.96) 0.012 (1.90) 0.009 (1.32)
Productivity -0.100 (-1.15) -0.100 (-1.17) -0.011 (-1.32)
Capital-labor ratio 0.098 (5.24) 0.098 (5.24) 0.091 (4.87)
Kaplan-Zingales indicator -0.016 (-0.40) -0.042 (-0.97)
Debt-assets ratio -0.091 (-0.45)
Cash ow-assets ratio -0.679 (-2.56)
Cut 1 1.770 (21.12) 1.757 (19.55) 1.521 (10.97)
Cut 2 1.936 (21.38) 1.913 (20.15) 1.678 (11.85)
Cut 3 2.563 (24.10) 2.550 (22.62) 2.319 (15.47)
Observations 3014 3014 3014
Log likelihood -831.7 -831.6 -828.8
Likelihood ratio 
2
37.1 37.3 42.9
Probability of LR-Test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of the Census; and own calculations.
Note: All plant-year observations. t-values in parentheses.
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Table 12: Operating status equations (ordered probit estimates)
Specication I II III
Capital -0.008 (-3.78) -0.007 (-3.61) -0.006 (-2.55)
Plant age -0.004 (-0.49) -0.004 (-0.41) -0.012 (-1.23)
Productivity -0.010 (-0.08) -0.006 (-0.05) -0.018 (-0.14)
Capital-labor ratio 0.086 (3.99) 0.085 (3.96) 0.072 (3.38)
Kaplan-Zingales indicator 0.041 (0.68) -0.010 (-0.15)
Debt-assets ratio 0.168 (0.56)
Cash ow-assets ratio -1.127 (-2.80)
Cut 1 0.499 (4.05) 0.530 (4.02) 0.211 (1.00)
Cut 2 0.759 (5.89) 0.789 (5.79) 0.475 (2.23)
Cut 3 1.663 (11.56) 1.693 (10.94) 1.394 (6.32)
Observations 573 573 573
Log likelihood -519.5 -519.2 -514.3
Likelihood ratio 
2
19.1 19.7 29.5
Probability of LR-Test 0.007 0.001 0.001
Source: Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of the Census; and own calculations.
Notes : Last observed year of each plant spell only. t-values in parentheses.
28
Table 13: Investment regime equations (ordered probit estimates)
Specication I II III
Capital 0.005 (5.17) 0.005 (4.75) 0.003 (3.15)
Plant age -0.014 (-3.57) -0.015 (-3.83) -0.008 (-1.84)
Productivity 0.121 (2.17) 0.115 (2.04) 0.125 (2.20)
Capital-labor ratio -0.180 (-16.11) -0.180 (-16.03) -0.160 (-13.87)
Kaplan-Zingales indicator -0.069 (-3.19) -0.026 (-1.16)
Debt-assets ratio -0.171 (-1.38)
Cash ow-assets ratio 1.094 (6.51)
Cut 1 -1.728 (-33.35) -1.787 (-32.41) -1.490 (-16.85)
Cut 2 -0.465 (-9.41) -0.521 (-9.87) -0.213 (-2.42)
Observations 3014 3014 3014
Log likelihood -2668.3 -2663.6 -2636.7
Likelihood ratio 
2
204.5 214.0 267.7
Probability of LR-Test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of the Census; and own calculations.
Note: t-values in parentheses.
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Table 14: Plant exit equations (Probit estimates)
Specication I II III
Constant -2.070 (-20.92) -2.020 (-19.30) -1.812 (-10.58)
Capital -0.008 (-3.49) -0.008 (-3.61) -0.007 (-3.12)
Plant age 0.026 (3.51) 0.025 (3.35) 0.018 (2.39)
Productivity -0.017 (-0.16) -0.019 (-0.18) -0.027 (-0.24)
Capital-labor ratio 0.094 (4.72) 0.095 (4.75) 0.083 (4.08)
Kaplan-Zingales indicator -0.064 (-1.34) -0.110 (-2.16)
Debt-assets ratio 0.284 (1.16)
Cash ow-assets ratio -0.978 (-2.82)
Observations 3014 3014 3014
Log likelihood -517.7 -516.9 -510.6
Likelihood ratio 
2
35.93 37.80 50.48
Probability of LR test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of the Census; and own calculations.
Note: t-values in parentheses.
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Table 15: Investment equations (OLS estimates)
Specication I II III
Constant 1.039 (3.55) 1.288 (3.89) -1.387 (-2.58)
Capital 0.119 (13.41) 0.113 (12.73) 0.121 (17.01)
Plant age -0.083 (-2.59) -0.065 (-2.15) -0.070 (-3.09)
Productivity -0.242 (-1.17) -0.262 (-1.26) -0.155 (-0.76)
Capital-labor ratio -0.560 (-3.63) -0.459 (-3.08) -0.640 (-5.32)
Kaplan-Zingales indicator -0.120 (-1.12) 0.384 (3.01)
Debt-assets ratio -1.906 (-3.59)
Cash ow-assets ratio 7.640 (7.76)
Mills ratio 11.120 (1.65) 6.482 (1.00) 21.993 (3.91)
Observations 3014 3014 3014
Total SS 80318.3 80318.3 80318.3
Residual SS 60912.3 60855.8 58990.2
R
2
0.242 0.242 0.266
Probability of F -Test 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), U.S. Bureau of the Census; and own calculations.
Note: t-values in parentheses.
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